Summary Biometric template protection is an important supplement to biometric systems. It can safeguard users' privacy and prevent potential security risks such as identity theft and cross matching. Additionally, it enables renewability and revocability of reference data in biometric systems, which are indispensable in identity management. This thesis meets the challenge of quantifying their privacy and security performance and defines a systematic evaluation framework, which adheres to essential criteria and requirements of biometric template protection techniques. Its applicability is demonstrated with the analysis of the algorithms for different biometric modalities. The assessment presented in this thesis is fundamental for a thorough analysis. Furthermore, it provides provable evidence on security and privacy performance. It creates a basis for certification and benchmarking.
Introduction
Automatic authentication is the cornerstone of e-commerce and e-government and enables transactions over internet. Biometrics recognizes a person based on his/her physical or behavioral characteristics and creates a direct link between an identity and its owner. It improves the trustworthiness of authentication. Nowadays, they are widely used in banking, physical and logical access controls, border control, ePasssport, ID-cards and forensics.
As biometrics plays a growing role in diverse areas, their security and privacy concerns grab the attention of researchers, public sectors, government agencies and end users. Biometric information needs to be stored for the sake of authentication. However, if personal biometric data fall into hands of adversaries, serious security and privacy problems arise. An adversary can create a fake modality to spoof biometric systems. He can also track activities of a victim in other biometric applications. Unfortunately a biometric modality is hard or impossible to change. Compromise of biometric data is permanent. Renewing or revocation of biometric identities is infeasible.
Biometric Template Protection
In order to overcome these drawbacks and limitations, template protection techniques are developed as a supplement to biometric systems. They can produce multiple pseudonymous references from biometric data. These references are supposed to be unlinkable and noninvertible in order to protect biometric information and to avoid security vulnerabilities. Numerous template protection algorithms exist and can be categorized into transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems. The integration in biometric systems is commonly accepted in research and their feasibility regarding the recognition performance is proved. However, their efficiency with respect to security and privacy protection is only poorly investigated.
This thesis addressed the problem "how to make a comprehensive and systematic assessment of the privacy and security performance of biometric template protection algorithms" and proposed a general evaluation framework.
The Evaluation Framework
In this thesis, a generalized evaluation framework is proposed, which gives an instruction to derive a formal Figure 1 The generalized evaluation framework. evaluation process for different template protection regarding security and privacy. As depicted in Figure 1 , the framework consists of three main steps: identifying protection goals, determining threat models and developing the evaluation metrics and corresponding evaluation methods.
After carefully analyzing the requirements on template protection techniques, three main protection goals are summarized, namely security, privacy protection ability and unlinkability. The security shows the hardness for an adversary to fake a verification process. The privacy protection ability includes the hardness to retrieve original biometric data and the amount of biometric information contained in stored protected templates. The unlinkability considers scenarios that an adversary has access to multiple protected templates. On one hand, pseudonymous templates of a user from different applications should be not matched with each other. It is so called cross matching resistance. On other hand, combining more pseudonymous templates of the same user should not cause more privacy leakage. They represent the functionalities that template protection should fulfill and are the evaluation criterion.
Threat models describe the ability of an adversary and also determine which a priori information, system parameters and functions are allowed to access during evaluation. They are not only important prerequisites but also the valid context of evaluation results. Three main threat models are given: the first model, so called naive model, assumes that an adversary has very limited information about a system; in the second model, the advanced model, Kerckhoffs' principle is applied and assumed essential details of algorithms as well as properties of biometric data are known; the last model, called the collision threat model, assumes that an adversary owns large amount of biometric data and this allows him to exploit inaccuracy of biometric systems.
After clarifying protection goals and threat model, the metrics quantifying different protection goals as well as an evaluation process measuring the metrics need to be developed. Both theoretical evaluation with metrics such as entropy, mutual information and practical evaluation based on special attacks can be used. Theoretical evaluation gives a boundary of security and privacy performance and shows whether vulnerabilities exist or not. In contrast, practical evaluation demonstrates, whether a system can be broken in practice or not. Theoretical and practical evaluations are complements to each other. Diverse evaluation metrics increase difficulty to compare different algorithms. Therefore the formal definitions of privacy and security are given using unified evaluation metrics. These metrics measure the computational time of an attack attempt and the number of attempts required on average until an adversary achieves his goal.
Empirical Assessment of Biometric Template Protection
The framework for privacy and security assessment is applied on the protected systems for 3D face and iris recognition. I developed my own 3D face recognition algorithm based on the depth distribution of facial subsurfaces and integrated it in the fuzzy commitment scheme. The iris recognition is based on an open source algorithm using Gabor filter. It is implemented in a fundamental protection scheme in this area proposed by Hao et al. The rigorous assessments detect the weaknesses of these systems. Their construction has been proved to be secure in the case of uniformly identically distributed biometric features. Unfortunately, this strict condition is difficult to fulfill in practice. Both the 3D face features and the iris features represent local characteristics of the modalities. Thus, strong dependency within these features is observed. As consequences, both security and privacy protection ability are very poor. The big challenge in quantifying the protection goals is to know the distribution of biometric features. Many security analyses are suspected to overestimate security performance due to simplified assumptions of feature distribution. Depending on the properties of biometric features, the second order dependency tree is applied to describe the distribution of 3D face features and the Markov model is applied to characterize the statistical properties of iris features. The measurement with theoretical metrics shows that the achieved security is much smaller than the secret size, which is the assumed security in a perfect secure case.
The biometric features can not be sufficiently protected and high privacy leakage exists.
Additionally, the characteristic of iris features is exploited to perform an attack retrieving features from pseudonymous templates. The efficiency of the practical attack confirms the result in the theoretical assessment of privacy with conditional entropy.
The analyses of the unlinkability shows that these protected systems are vulnerable to cross matching. A user can be identified by linking his pseudonymous templates. The cross matching attacks are simulated and assessed with the efficiency of the attacks. The protected iris systems are resistant to leakage amplification and combining more pseudonymous templates cannot expose more information about biometric features.
The security and privacy assessment within this thesis is completed by a comparison of two fuzzy commitment algorithms with the fuzzy vault algorithm for fingerprint recognition. Here, different threat models as well as the corresponding protection goals are considered. The fuzzy vault system has the best performance regarding security and irreversibility of biometric features. However, all of these systems are vulnerable to cross matching. The comparison results show that the proposed evaluation framework provides the fundamental basis for benchmarking different template protection algorithms.
The proposed framework is also validated with the existing security analysis on transformation-based approaches. Unlike the analysis on biometric cryptosystems, the security is dependent on the hardness of transformation functions or randomization processes. Therefore, the presented analysis is based on efficiency of different kinds of attacks, which measure one or more protection goals in the appropriate threat models. The security of these approaches depends on the transformation parameters. The knowledge of these parameters allows generating a datum, which can fake verification process. Although it is still hard to estimate the original biometric features practically, the risk of privacy leakage amplification exists. In comparison with biometric cryptosystems, the transformation-based approaches can protect biometric features better and are more resistant to cross matching. However, their security relies on the secret transformation parameter and security performance is relatively poor. In biometric cryptosystems, privacy leakage is unavoidable due to noise tolerance. Therefore these systems are vulnerable to cross matching. A hybrid system combining transformation-based approaches and biometric cryptosystems is promising to solve all these problems. Being aware of these weaknesses helps developers to improve their systems. For instance, the assessment in this thesis shows that the coding process is an essential step in fuzzy commitment. The coding process can be adapted to properties of the underlying biometric features and the security and privacy performance can be further improved.
Conclusions
Privacy protection is of crucial importance in biometric systems. As shown in this thesis, the exposure of biometric information can cause serious security problems. Long-term security of biometric systems can only be achieved with privacy enhancing techniques like template protection. Only rigorous assessment can ensure the security and privacy performance of protected systems and guarantee the success of template protection techniques.
The framework enables thorough assessments. It helps users to understand privacy and security risks in biometric systems and demonstrates improvements applying template protection techniques. It promotes the growth of the market and creates transparency between users and system provider. This framework is the first one enabling comprehensive evaluation and ranking of biometric template protection. The proposed protection goals and threat models regarding privacy and security are of fundamental importance in the scientific biometric community as they fill a gap. 
Preview on issue 5/2012
The topic of our next issue will be "Social Computing in Corporations" (Editor: Michael Koch) and it will contain the following articles: 
